Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1990

Bodell Contruction Company, Inc. v. David I
McOmber, Rachael B. McOmber, Steven M.
Snelson and David I McOmber, Trustees of the
David I. McOmber Family Trust : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
B. Ray Zoll; Attorney for Appellee McOmber; J. Rand Hirshi; Attorney for Appellee Snelson.
Keith W. Meade; Cohne, Rappaport and Segal; Attorney for Appellant Bodell.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Bodell Contruction Company, Inc. v. McOmber, No. 900338 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2733

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAH COURT

*,S

be.
I

.VENT

D^OETNO.

URT OF APPEALS
Wtf>*&<tf>
STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC.
Plaintiff and
Appellant,

90-0338-Cft
Case No.
Argument Priority 16

DAVID I. McOMBER, RACHAEL B.
McOMBER, STEVEN M. SNELSON and
DAVID I. McOMBER and RACHAEL B.
McOMBER, Trustees of the David
I. McOmber Family Trust,
Defendants and
Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

Appeal by Bodell Construction from Final Summary
Judgment entered by the Honorable George E. Ballif,
Fourth District Court, Utah County.

B. Ray Zoll
Attorney for Appellee
McOmber
5300 South 360 West, #360
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
J. Rand Hirschi
Attorney for Appellee Snelson
230 South 500 East, #460
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

Keith W. Meade
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorney for Appellant Bodell
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008

FILED
JUN 2 71990
torfryT Hoomn
Cta* of * • Court
Ufcii Court #f *pp**l*

COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC.
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No.
Argument Priority 16
DAVID I. McOMBER, RACHAEL B.
McOMBER, STEVEN M. SNELSON and
DAVID I. McOMBER and RACHAEL B.
McOMBER, Trustees of the David
I. McOmber Family Trust,
Defendants and
Appellees.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

Appeal by Bodell Construction from Final Summary
Judgment entered by the Honorable George E. Ballif,
Fourth District Court, Utah County.

B. Ray Zoll
Attorney for Appellee
McOmber
5300 South 360 West, #360
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
J. Rand Hirschi
Attorney for Appellee Snelson
230 South 500 East, #460
Salt Lake City, UT 84102

Keith W. Meade
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorney for Appellant Bodell
525 East First South
Fifth Floor
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

9

ARGUMENT
I.

10
The August 31, 1984 (First) Trustee's Sale
Was Void For Want Of An Authorized Buyer
A.

Associated Title had no actual authority
to bid at the August 31, 1984 sale
1.
2.

B.
II.
III.
IV.

10
11

The January 9 letter did not create
authority

12

The sale alone does not create express
or implied authority in Associated

17

Associated Title did not have apparent
authority to purchase the property

24

Bodell Did Not Ratify The August Trustee's
Sale

27

The November Sale Is Not Barred By Any
"Unilateral Mistake"

29

There Are Issues Of Fact Which Preclude
Summary Judgment Against Bodell

30

CONCLUSION

33

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:

Page
Allen v. Steinberg. 223 A. 2d 240 (Md. 1966)

16

Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of President of Church, etc. ,
534 P. 2d 887 (Utah 1975)
24
Blodqett v. Martsch. 590 P. 2d 298 (Utah 1978)

23

Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. State, 779 P. 2d 634
(Utah 1989)

2

Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P. 2d 74 (Utah 1982)

27

Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz. 501 P. 2d 266
(Utah 1972)
13
City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-Plymouth. 672 P. 2d 89
(Utah 1983)

25

Cox v. Helenius. 693 P. 2d 683 (Wash. 1985)

23

Cruikshank v. Horn. 386 N. W. 2d 134 (Iowa A . 1986)
20
Ebasco Services. Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co. ,
402 F. Supp. 421, subsequent decision at 460 F. Supp. 163
(E. D. Pa. 1975)
19
Ellsworth v. Harmon. 101 111.274 (1881)
E P S V V.

22

Eels. 207 N. E. 2d 918 (Mass. 1965)

21

Fuller v. Fasig Tipton Co. . Inc. . 587 F. 2d 103
(CA 2 1978)

28

Gillman v. Dept. of Financial Instit. , 782 P. 2d 506
(Utah 1989)

2,10,24,27

Kellv v. Longmever. 435 S. W. 2d 818 (Tenn. 1967)

21

Kuhn v. Kuhn. 642 P. 2d 524 (Colo. App. 1981)

25

Mercantile Trust Co.. N. A. v. Harper, 622 S. W. 2d 345
(Mo. App. 1981)
Old Security Life Insur. Co. v. Continental Illinois
National Bank & Trust. 740 F. 2d 1384 (CA 7 1984)
ii

15
29

Roskwitalski v. Reiss, 402 A, 2d 1061, affd. in relevant
part and reversed in part, 487 A. 2d 864 (Pa, 1979). . . . 21
Sandbera v. Kline. 576 P. 2d 1291 (Utah 1978)

32

Seftel v. Capital Citv Bank. 767 P. 2d 941
(Utah A. 1989)

11,27,30

Thomas v. Kennedy. 130 A. 2d 97 (Pa. 1957)

14

Williams v. Singleton. 723 P. 2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986) . . . . 29
STATUTES:
U. C. A. §25-5-1

28,29

U.C. A. §57-1-27(2)

20

OTHER AUTHORITIES:
2A C. J. S. , Agency. §146

11

2A C. J. S. , Agency. §154

22

2A C. J. S. , Agency. §157

24

3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency. §185

27

3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency. §187

27

Restatement of Agency 2d, §34

14

Restatement of Agency 2d, §35

18

Restatement of Agency 2d, §37

16

iii

This Brief is filed by the appellant Bodell
Company.

Bodell

seeks

i) the reversal

Construction

of the trial

court's

Summary Judgment in favor of Snelson and McOmber, ii) the entry
of Judgment in favor of Bodell, and iii) the remand of the case
for the purpose

of establishing the amount of deficiency due

Bodell.

In the alternative, Bodell seeks a determination that

summary

judgment

in

favor

of

Snelson

and

McOmber

was

inappropriate because material issues of fact existed.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction lies in this Court pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 3 of the Utah constitution and U. C. A. §78-2a-3(2)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The following issues are presented for review:
1.

Was the trustee' s sale conducted in August, 1984

void for want of a buyer and an authorized bid?
2.

Did the trustee have authority to bid on behalf of

the beneficiary (Bodell) at the August 19, 1985 trustee's sale?
3.
of

law

and

Did the District Court err in ruling as a matter
by

summary

judgment

that

the

trustee

(Associated

Title) was authorized to bid for Bodell, or that Bodell ratified
the bid?
4.

Did the Court error in not granting plaintiff s

motion for summary judgment?
Standard for Review:
The

issues

were

each

decided

by

summary

judgment.

The

standard of review on this appeal is for this court to review
1

the trial court' s conclusions of law for correctness.

Gillman v.

Dept. of Financial Instit. . 782 P. 2d 506 (Utah 1989).
the trial
court

Because

court granted summary judgment against Bodell, this

should

construe

the

facts

presented

in

the

summary

judgment proceedings in the light most favorable to Bodell.

Blue

Cross & Blue Shield v. State. 779 P. 2d 634 (Utah 1989).
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Bodell

does

not

assert

that

the

interpretation

of

any

statute or rule of procedure is determinative.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This

action

is

trustee' s sale.

one

to

Competing

motions

filed in the district court.
was

first

entered

District

Court

appealed

to

in

favor

in May,

the

determine

invalidity

for summary

(R. 190, 221. )
of

1987.

Supreme

the

defendants

(R.

268. )

by

Bodell.

judgment

a

were

Summary judgment

the

Court

of

by

That

the

Fourth

decision was

The

dismissed because of the lack of a Rule 54(b) order.

appeal

was

(R. 462.)

The trial court allowed the parties to augment the record and
affirmed its prior ruling granting summary judgment in favor of
the defendants.
a

Rule

54(b)

transferred

(R. 568. )

The trial court included in its Order

determination

of

finality.

This

case

was

from the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals on

June 25, 1990.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented for
review:
2

1.
brokered

The

loan

by

Roger

representative

which

is

Terry

of

the

of

subject

Landmark

Landmark,

was

of

this

action was

Mortgage.

originally

Terry,

contacted

a
by

representatives of Snelson and McOmber to see if he could arrange
the loan.

(Snelson deposition, R. 286, p. 14)

fee by Snelson and McOmber to secure the loan.
McOmber deposition, R. 287. )

Terry was paid a
(Exhibit 6 to the

Terry contacted Bodell to see if

Bodell was interested in providing funds for the loan.
first deposition, 11/25/86, R. 288, p. 16. )

(Bodell7 s

Bodell had made some

(five or ten) prior mortgage loans, only one of which had gone
bad and which was cured after the foreclosure process began but
before sale.

Bodell is a construction company and was not in

the business of making mortgage loans.

(Bodell' s deposition, R.

288, p. 13 and 14. )
2.

In November, 1983, Bodell loaned Snelson and McOmbers

$200, 000. 00

pursuant

to

McOmbers' residence.
3.
McOmbers

a

note

secured

by

a trust

deed

on

(McOmber Answer, para. 3, R. 11. )

The purpose of the loan was, in part, for Snelsons and
to

raise

venture

capital

for

a

joint

enterprise.

(McOmber deposition, R. 287, p. 22. )
4.

No payments

were

ever made

on the

note.

(McOmber

deposition, R. 287, p. 22. )
5.

On January 9, 1984, when Bodell asked Roger Terry of

Landmark Mortgage to have someone begin foreclosure, Terry asked
for and was given by Bodell the following letter to "get the ball
rolling: "

3

Gentlemen,
Please
accept
this
letter
as
authorization
to i m m e d i a t e l y
begin
foreclosure against the property associated
with this loan.
We grant you and the title company of
your choice full and complete authority
regarding this foreclosure action.
Please inform me if you require further
information.
Very truly yours,
s/Michael J. Bodell
(Bodell's deposition dated 2/8/89, p. 26; Letter is Exhibit 6 to
Terry deposition. )
(At the time of the February 23, 1990 hearing, there was
before

the

trial

court

by

oral

stipulation three

depositions

which were not yet included in the record on appeal at the time
appellant prepared its opening brief.

Appellant is working to

have these items included by the clerk.

Those depositions were

as

Bodell

follows:

Deposition

of

Michael

dated

2/8/89;

Deposition of Roger Terry dated 12/22/88; and Deposition of Blake
Heiner, dated 2/8/89.

In addition, a transcript of the summary

judgment hearing has been requested but is not completed. )
6.

Terry told Bodell that he needed the January 9 letter

for "authorization to deliver papers to a trustee to start the
foreclosure."

Terry ultimately asked Associated Title to act as

the trustee and start the foreclosure.

(Terry deposition dated

12/22/88, p. 34-39. )
7.

There is no evidence that either Snelson or McOmber
4

ever saw Bodell' s letter of January 9,
to Associated Title before the sale,

J.^64.

McOmber never spoke

(McOmber deposition, R.

287, p. 23. )
8.

Snelson never had any contact with Bodell at any time.

(Snelson deposition, R. 286, p. 25-26. )
9.

Both

Roger

Terry

(Landmark)

and

Blake

Heiner

(Associated) stated that they never understood that the January 9
letter gave them authority to determine the bid for Bode 1.1 at the
trustee' s sale.

(Affidavits of Blake Heiner and Roger Terry, R.

214, 211, copies attached as Exhibits 1 and 2. )
10.

Blake Heiner testified wi t:h i:ega rd 1:c the J anuary 9,

1984 letter that:
a.
he never discussed it with Bodell or Terry
(Heiner deposition dated 2/8/89, p. 21); and,
b.
that Associated Title would not have relied on the
letter as giving it authority to determine the bid at
the sale and that they did not do so in this case.
(Heiner deposition, 2/8/89, p. 22, 1. 1-4, 6-9. )
11.
if

Roger Terry testified that he would be very surprised

Bodell

took

the

position

foreclosure sale for him.

that

Terry

was

handling

the

"I wasn't handling anything for him.

The only thing that I did for him was to start the foreclosure. "
(Terry deposition, 12/22/88, p. 126. )
12.
come

Prior to the August sale of the property, Bodell had
that

.•

less than the unpaid loan balance.

- • ^

property was far

Bodell had told Roger Terry

at Landmark prior to the first sale that Bodell wanted to obtain
a deficiency from the sale.

(Bodell s • :3 eposi tion, 2/8/89, p. 39,
5

40,

41;

Bodell

affidavit,

paragraph

2,

R.

500;

Roger

Terry

deposition, Exhibit 5A - entry at 8/23/84 at page 2 of Exhibit
5A. )
13.

Roger Terry of Landmark testified that his wife was

contacted by Associated Title

(the trustee) shortly before the

sale and asked to give a payoff amount.

Mr. Terry testified that

he

loan

called

Associated

requested.

back

with

the

payoff

amount

as

Terry understood that this amount was needed in case

Snelson or McOmber wanted to pay the loan off prior to the sale.
Terry never understood that he was being requested to give a bid
amount for the sale.

Terry knew at the time he called Associated

and left a message giving the payoff amount that Bodell wanted to
obtain a deficiency.

(Terry deposition,

p.

56,

57,

66, and

Exhibit 5A. )
14.
testified

Blake

Heiner

(of

that he could

Associated

Title,

the

trustee)

not recall discussing with Terry any

request for a bid amount in connection with this sale.

Heiner

agreed in his deposition that any conversation likely could have
been in the form of a message left with Terry' s wife.

When Mr.

Heiner went to the sale, the only information that he had from
Mr. Terry was in the form of a telephone message which stated, in
full,

that

foreclosure

the

"payoff

costs."

on

(The

Exhibit 3 and is at R. 205. )

sale

tomorrow

telephone

($243, 127. 15) plus

message

is

attached

as

(Heiner deposition, pp. 11, 12, 44,

45. )
15.

The "payoff" amount which Terry gave Heiner included
6

not only the amount due under the trust deed, but Terry' s loan
fees

owed

2/8/89, ^
16.

him

by

McOmber

and

Snelson.

(Bodell

deposition,

79; Terry deposition, p. 71, 72. )
Neither Landmark nor Associated ever discussed bidding

with Bodell before the first sale.

1 n tact, Associated never

spoke with Bodell at all before the first sale.

Bodell did not

understand that he had a right to bid at the sale.

Bodell did

not know and was never told that anj amount would be b:i ci at the
sale on his behalf and assumed that if no one bid, he would own
the property.

Bodell did not know that Associated needed bidding

instructions.

(Bodell affidavit, paragraphs 2-6, 8, R. 500-503;

Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 36, 38, 64-69, 72, 114. ).
17.

Ho

one

other

than

Blake

Heiner

of Associated

attended the August 31, 1984 !::: zi us tee ' s sal e

Title

(Heiner affidavit,

para. 5, R. 211. )
18.

The

"Bid"

referred

to in the

trustee's

deed,

dated

September 11, 1984 was made by Blake Heiner at the sale on August
31,

1984 and was based upon the telephone message he received

from Terry which gave the "payoff" amount.

(Heiner affidavit,

para. 6, R. 211, 212. )
19.

There

is

no

evidence

that

Snelson

or

McOmber

ever

discussed with Bodell, Associated or Terry at any time the amount
bid or to be bid at the sale.

There is no evidence that Snelson

or McOmber were ever aware of what amount was to be bid or was in
fact bid at sale.
sale.

Neither Snelson nor McOmber attended the first

McOmber continued to reside in the home even after the

7

first

sale.

(McOmber deposition,

R.

287, p.

22, 23; Heiner

depo. , p. 19; Bodell depo. , p. 91. )
20.
Bodell,

The trust deed given to Bodell by McOmber authorized
upon

default.
11. )

any

default

by

McOmber,

to

collect

rents

upon

(A copy of the trust deed is at R. 202, para. 10 and

After the date of the August (first) trustees sale, Bodell

signed an agreement listing the property for sale.

The listing

contained an exception for the benefit of McOmber.

Bodell also

accepted one rent check from occupants of a basement apartment in
the

amount

of

$200. 00.

(Listing

is

Exhibit

18

to

Terry

deposition; Bodell affidavit, para. 7, R. 501, 502. )
21.

As soon as Bodell became aware of the dollar amount of

the bid made by Associated at the August sale, Bodell objected.
(Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 80. )
22.

On or about October 3, 1984, and within a few days of

when it received the trustee' s deed, Bodell sought legal advice
about how it could collect the balance due on its note.

Prior to

Bodell's October 3, 1984 meeting with Richard Rappaport, neither
Associated

nor Landmark had explained

to Bodell

the role the

amount bid at sale played in obtaining a deficiency.

At Bodell' s

meeting with Rappaport, Bodell learned for the first time that
Associated' s

unauthorized

obtain a deficiency.

bid

could

affect

Bodell' s

right

to

(Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 113, 114,

84, 82; Bodell affidavit, para. 6, 8, 9, R. 501-503. )
23.

After Bodell was advised by Rappaport of the role that

the amount bid played in obtaining a deficiency, Bodell contacted
8

McOmber and Associated Title and advised them that the bid had
not been authorized

Bodell terminated his listing and McOmber

entered into a new listing agreement with the real estate agent,
Cal Monson, effective October 4, 1984 and continued to reside in
the home and attempt to s ell the home uiit: i J
sale.

after

the s econd

The listing agreement signed by McOmber states in part

that
"I [McOmber] hereby warrant the information herein to
be correct and that I have marketable title or an
otherwise established right to sell, lease or exchange
said property, except as stated. •'
(Listing Agreement,

R. 206. )

(Bodell

Bodell deposition, p. 93, 8 6, 81. )
recorder

quit clai in deed back f re

affidavit,

R.

501, 502;

Associated Title accepted and
~ -c- •

ch stated i n p art

that "this deed is given to reconvey a trusteed deed which was
recorded September 11, 1984 which was erroneously given to Bodell
Construction Company. "

Associated recorded this deed, published

a new notice of sale, and reconducted the sale on the 19th day of
November, 1984.
24.

(R. 202, 207. )

The property was resold on Nc member 19, 1984.

At this

sale, a bid of $170,000.00 was made at the direction of Bodell.
(R. 240).
SillMMAk'iii' Dl ARGUMENT
The

pivotal

issue

on

appeal

is

whether

there

authorized bid at the August, 1984 (first) trustee7 s sale.
authorized bid was made, there was no buyer and no sale.

was

an

If no
Bodell

contends that the trustee (Associated) had no authority, actual
or apparent, to purchase the property on Bodell' s behalf at the

9

August sale and that no sale occurred,
first sale.
requisite

Bodell did not ratify the

Bodell never had knowledge of material facts or the

intent

sufficient

on

to sustain,

summary

judgment,

ratification.
In the alternative, the record with regard to the authority
of the trustee to bid at the August, 1984 sale and ratification
was

such

that

summary

judgment

against

Bodell

was

not

appropriate and should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I
THE AUGUST 31, 1984 (FIRST) TRUSTEE'S SALE
WAS VOID FOR WANT OF AN AUTHORIZED BUYER.
The August 31, 1984 trustee's sale (the first sale) could
have

been

valid

only

if

the

trustee,

Associated

Title,

had

authority to bid and purchase on behalf of Bodell Construction at
that sale.

Without authority, there was no buyer and no sale.

The

courts

trial

judgment,

(R.

573,

574)

concludes

that

"...Associated Title had actual and apparent authority to conduct
the Trustee' s sale and enter a bid . . . *'

This conclusion of law

is subject to review in this court for correctness.

Gillman v.

Dept. of Financial Instit. , 782 P. 2d 506 (Utah 1989).
It is hornbook law that an agent's authority is "composed of
his [1] actual authority, express or implied, together with the

The Judgment (R. 572) was mailed to the trial court on
April 19 (a Thursday) and signed on April 24 (a Tuesday), without
any opportunity for the plaintiff to object to any of the
statements included by Snelson, all contrary to Rule 4-504(2)
C. J. A.
10

[2] apparent or ostensible authority which the principal by his
conduct precludes h i mself from denying.
A
August

2,A C. J. S. Agency* §146.

Associated Title had no actual authority to bid at the
31,

1984

j udgment.

sale.

Becaus e

This

summary

matter

j udgment

was

dep:i ::l ves

Bodell) of its opportunity to present its
appellate
most

courts

favorable

granted.
1989).

review the
to

Seftel

the

v.

facts

party

Capital

decided

whom

gitY PfrflX/

a

summary

pa i : t:;y

(here

case on the merits,

and inferences

against

by

the

767 P. 2d

in the

light

judgment
941

was

(Utah A.

2

Neither

the

letter

::> f

J a nu a ry

9,

19 8 4

i I o i: a i y

o t her

communication from Bodell authorized either Terry or Associated
Title to do anything other than to "begin foreclosure" under the
trust deed.
nor

any

(Exhibit 6 to Terry deposition. )

conversation

expressly

authorized

Neither the letter

Associated

Title

to

either determine a bid or purchase the property for Bodell.
Snelson' s argument before the trial

court that

Associated

Title had actual authority to purchase and enter a bid is really
an argument that the authority of Associated Title was implied.
The implied authority, as presented by Snelson, relies upon two
factors:
(a)

The January

9,

1984 letter which states in full

that:
2
Because the case was decided on summary judgment, the
only facts to be marshalled in support of the judgment (if indeed
t h e r e is an o b l i g a t i o n to m a r s h a l l f a c t s ) are found in
defendants' statement of facts in its Memorandum in Support of
its Motion.
(R. 485-490. )

11

Gentlemen,
Please accept this letter as
authorization to immediately begin
foreclosure against the property
associated with this loan.
We hereby grant you and the
title company of your choice full
and complete authority regarding
this foreclosure action.
Pl^frge inform me
if you require further information.
Very truly yours,
S/Michael J. Bodell
(Emphasis added, )
(Letter

is

Exhibit

6

to

Terry

deposition

dated

12/22/88.)
(b)

Secondly,

Snelson relies

upon the event

of the

trustee' s sale itself as creating implied authority in the title
company to bid.
1.

The January 9 letter did not create authority.

The undisputed evidence was that the letter was not relied
on by those involved in the sale as granting authority to either
Associated or Landmark to bid on or purchase the property at the
sale.

(Heiner deposition, p. 22; Terry deposition, p. 61; Bodell

deposition 2/8/89, p. 26, 32. )

While the trial court did not

state the basis for its conclusion that Associated had authority
to purchase the property for Bodell at the trustee' s sale, in the
summary judgment proceedings the trial court apparently chose to
ignore this undisputed
January

9

letter

evidence.

created

Snelson' s argument that the

authority
12

is

a

lawyer' s

argument

created after the fact for a party that never saw or was aware of
the letter until after this action was commenced.

Where there

was no evidence that either Snelson or McOmber ever saw or relied
on the January 9 letter, the interpretation of the letter by the
parties to it (Bodell, Landmark and Associated) should be, not
only persuasive, but determinative of the fact that it granted no
authority to Associated to bid or purchase for Bodell.

Bullfrog

Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 501 P. 2d 266 (Utah 1972).
The facts and circumstances around the letter construed in
the

light

most

favorable

to

Bodell

create,

at

a minimum,

a

genuine issue of material fact about the extent of authority the
letter granted:
(i)

Heiner himself testified that he would not

have treated the January 9 letter as authority to bid
(Heiner deposition, p. 22);
(ii)

Terry

informed

Bodell

that

the

letter was required to start the foreclosure
process (Terry deposition, p. 35);
(iii)

Neither

Terry

nor

Heiner

considered the letter as a grant of authority
to determine
sale.

the

amount to be bid

at the

(Affidavits of Blake Heiner and Roger

Terry, R. 211, 214. )
(iv)

The letter itself does not state

that Terry or any title company had authority
to purchase the property on behalf of Bodell.
13

The Restatement of Agency 2d, §34, states in part that:
An authorization is interpreted
in light of all accompanying
circumstances, including among
other matters, (a) the situation of
the parties, their relations to one
another, and the business in which
they are engaged: . . . (d) the
nature of the subject matter, the
circumstances under which the act
is to be performed and the legality
or illegality of the act; and (e)
the formality or informality, and
the care, or lack of it, with which
an instrument evidencing the
authority is drawn.
(Emphasis
added. )
Snelson obviously relies upon the second paragraph in the
January

9

authority"

letter

which

regarding

refers

the

to

the

foreclosure

"full

action

and
and

complete
takes

the

position that the full authority granted included the right to
determine and make a bid at the sale and purchase the property.
This argument ignores the fact that no one involved at the time
gave the language such a broad interpretation.

This argument

also ignores the fact that the second paragraph merely modifies
the first, it simply makes clear the authority with respect to
beginning the sale.

If full authority on all matters was being

given, there would be no purpose in including the last paragraph
inviting questions.
modifying
equivalent

paragraph,
of

Even if the second paragraph were not a
the

absolute

or

term

"full

unlimited

authority"
discretion.

is

not

the

Thomas

v.

Kennedy. 130 A. 2d 97 (Pa. 1957).
As discussed in §34 of the Restatement, Snelson' s argument
must be considered in light of the situation of both Bodell and
14

Associated.
never

Bodell was

understood

this

not experienced

simple

in foreclosures.

letter to grant

anyone

He

decision

making authority, but understood it simply as a request to get
the "ball rolling."

(Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 26, 30, 31.)

The letter, when considered in light of Associated' s position as
trustee, was not in fact acted upon by Associated as creating the
authority to bid and purchase the property for Bodell.
deposition, p.
Newman,

no

22. )

title

As set forth in the Affidavit of Alfred

officer

would

reasonably

infer

authority from such a general letter of instructions.
para. 5)

(Heiner

such

broad

(R. 505,

The only evidence before the trial court on the scope

of authority to be drawn from the letter was i) that no authority
was considered by Associated to have been given by the letter to
determine and make the bid without further instruction, and ii)
that no trustee in Utah would have acted upon the January 9
letter as giving it authority to bid at the sale or purchase the
property without further instructions.
Such

a

broad

interpretation

of

authority

as

sought

by

Snelson is not favored by courts in determining the scope of
authority.

For example, in Mercantile Trust Co. . N. A. v. Harper,

622 S. W. 2d 345 (Mo. App. 1981) the contention was that a power of
attorney given to "transact all matters of business" allowed a
stock broker to rely upon the power of attorney to deposit the
client' s funds in any manner he chose.

As a result of the way

the funds were deposited by the broker (into a joint account),
the

funds

were

lost.

In discussing
15

the

scope

of

authority

granted, the Court observed as follows:
Well established rules of interpretation of
powers of attorney dictate that broad, allencompassing grants of power to the agent
must be discounted.
Restatement (2d) of
Agency, §34, comment h (1958).
Potentially
hazardous powers, such as the power to
borrow money on behalf of the principal,
cannot be inferred from the power of
attorney; it must be reasonably clear that
the principal intended to grant such power.
Id.
Language in a power of attorney that
apparently grants broad power to convey the
principal's property, such as the power to
convey "as sufficiently as [the principal]
could do personally, " is deemed to be mere
"window dressing" and must be disregarded.
. . (622 S. W. 2d at 349. )
Section 37 of the Restatement of Agency 2d, states in part
as follows:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed,
general
expressions used in authorizing an agent are
limited in application to acts done in
connection with the act or business to which
the authority primarily relates.
(2) A specific authorization of particular
acts tends to show that the more general
authority is not intended.
(emphasis added.)
In the January 9 letter, the specific authority in the first
paragraph was

"to immediately begin foreclosure."

Terry told

Bodell the letter was needed to begin the foreclosure.
deposition, 2/8/89, p. 26.)

(Bodell

As a matter of law, the more general

authority of the second paragraph can not be interpreted as a
carte blanche,

but merely

begin foreclosure.

as descriptive

In Allen v.

of the authority to

Steinberg,

223 A. 2d 240 (Md.

1966), a partnership existed for the purposes of "ownership and
promotion for development of a tract of land. "
16

In considering

the meaning of the authority to promote, the Court considered
parole evidence, and determined that the authority to promote did
not

include

the

authority

to

construct

improvements

on the

property and give mortgages to pay for those improvements.
"It is also generally held that power and
authority not specifically delegated in a partnership agreement is presumed to be
withheld." (p. 245.) . . .
It is difficult
to stretch an authorization to promote for
the development of land and in the process to
execute conveyances into an authorization for
the managing partners to mortgage land
without the partnership receiving the
proceeds of the mortgage or into an
authorization for the managing partners to
make unsecured loans for themselves,
Restatement
(Second),
Agency
§37,
particularly without advising the limited
partners of their intent to do so. " (at 246)
Applied to this case, the authority given by Bodell was to
start

the

foreclosure

process.

That

authorization

cannot be

stretched into the right to determine and enter a bid.
2.

The

sale

alQnQ

does

not

create

express

or

implied

authority in Associated.
Snelson argued (R. 493) that Associated's authority to bid
at the sale was incident to Bodell7 s request that Associated
conduct the foreclosure.

The suggestion that trustees, who are

obligated to conduct trustee' s sales, have plenary authority to
bid and purchase property at those sales for either beneficiaries
or trustors is an unsettling prospect.

Snelson gave the trial

court absolutely no evidence in support of the position that a
request

to

a trustee

in

Utah to

conduct

a

foreclosure

sale

carries with it the right to bid on or purchase the property
17

without

further

instruction.

Snelson

simply

asked

the trial

court to assume that a beneficiary' s request to a trustee to sell
carries with it the authority for the trustee to bid and purchase
at the sale on behalf of the beneficiary.
Section 35 of the Restatement of Agency 2d states in part
that
"Unless otherwise agreed, authority to
conduct a transaction includes authority to
do acts which are incidental to it, usually
accompany it or are reasonably necessary to
accomplish it. "
In

considering

trustee's
property

whether

or

carries

with

sale
for the

not

beneficiary,

the

the
this

authority

authority
Court

to

to

should

sell

at

a

purchase

the

consider

the

testimony of Blake Heiner (Associated) where he stated that he
would

not

(Heiner

have

determined

deposition,

p.

the bid without

22. )

Implied

further

authority

authority.

must

also

considered in light of the Affidavit of Alfred J. Newmam,

be
(R.

505, para. 5) wherein Newman stated that authority to determine a
bid does not flow from the mere request to conduct a foreclosure.
Indeed, Mr. Newman states that industry practices are such that
trustees in Utah either obtain written bidding instructions or at
a minimum,

advise the beneficiary

respect to the

consequences

which

disputed,

was

not

is

to seek legal

of its bid.
the

only

counsel with

Newman' s affidavit,
evidence

of

industry

practices, and makes it clear that there is no industry standard
in Utah that a trustee has authority to bid or purchase for a
beneficiary, unless he has express instructions to do so.

18

Industry

practices

may

be

considered

by

this

Court

determining the scope of authority incident to the sale.
Ebasco Services. Inc.
F. Supp.
1975),
"turn

v.

Pennsylvania

the supplier of turbines to a general
power

plant

project

employment of the general

In

Power & Light Co. . 402

421, subsequent decision at 460 F. Supp.

key"

in

contended

163

(E. D. Pa.

contractor on a

that

the

utility's

contractor to do all of the things

necessary to create a turn key project included the right to bind
the

utility

(the

equipment delivered.

principal)

with

respect

to

warranties

on

The agreement between the utility and the

contractor stated that "Ebasco shall in all cases use its best
efforts to obtain for PP&L warranties against defects and design,
workmanship and materials, the most favorable possible guarantees
of performance, . . . (447)."

The Court recognized that, while

in general, the question of the scope of authority created by a
written instrument is for the Court, that in deciding the issue,
that industry

standards

necessary to its decision.

and expectations

were material

issues

The Court stated:

While we cannot foresee the precise nature of
proof on this issue, it would seem that the
fact finder could consider in addition to the
facts concerning the relation between Ebasco
and PP&L, the practice in the construction
industry relating to authority given to turn
key
contractors
with
respect
to
specifications, change orders and general
contractual terms and conditions.
The
evidence might elucidate the question of
whether turn key contractors have plenary
power to give up beneficial contractual
provisions without consideration.
(449-450.)
In this case, the only evidence on industry standards is the
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Newman

affidavit

(R.

505) which

supports

the

conclusion

that

trustees in Utah are not viewed as having plenary power to bid
for or purchase the property for the beneficiary at a trustee' s
sale in the absence of additional express authority.

The trial

court' s conclusion of implied authority ignores this contrary and
undisputed testimony.
In considering whether the right to bid is "incident" to the
request to sell,
follow

that

this Court should consider that it does not

merely

because

necessarily be concluded.

a

sale

is

set

that

it

will

In the context of this sale, when

Blake Heiner got to the sale and observed that no one was present
on behalf of Bodell to bid (and in fact no one was present to
bid) he could have and should have continued the sale.
§57-1-27(2). )

(U. C. A.

There is also a considerable difference between

conducting a sale of property and buying property.
Limitations

on incidental authority are also reflected in

the case of Cruikshank v. Horn. 386 N. W. 2d 134 (Iowa A. 1986).
Horn was an auctioneer who conducted a farm sale for Cruikshank.
After

the

sale,

Horn deposited

the

sale

proceeds

in

a bank

account entitled "Hazel Cruikshank Sale - Don Horn - Clerk" in a
bank which failed the next day and the funds were lost.

The

issue was whether or not the auctioneer had authority incident
to the sale to deposit the checks and other proceeds from the
sale to allow all of the funds to be collected before paying them
to the owner of the property.

Horn attempted to establish that

his actions were consistent with the practice and custom of the
20

community.

The

disputed.

The

Cruikshank
account,

custom
Court

knew

such

the

an

and

practice,

observed

proceeds

assumption

that

would
was

not

however,
even

be

if

was

Horn

deposited

warranted.

in

highly
assumed
a

bank

Cruikshank

admitted that no specific instructions had been given as to how
the funds were to be handled.
"Had Cruikshank simply been informed of and
consented to the manner in which Horn handled
the proceeds, the result may well have been
different.
Because Horn breached his
fiduciary duty to disclose all relevant
information, i.e. how the proceeds would be
handled, and did not obtain Cruikshank' s
consent to depositing them in a bank, Horn
acted outside the scope of his authority."
Applied to the facts of this case, had Associated Title simply
informed Bodell of the bidding process and its need to obtain
bidding

instructions,

the

result

would

certainly

have

been

different.
There are many cases in which it was contended that an owner
of

property,

by

employing

a real

estate

agent

to

sell

real

property for a certain price, necessarily cloaked the agent with
authority to enter into the agreement to sell on behalf of the
principal.

It has been uniformly held that such an agreement

does not give a seller' s agent authority to sell, even though the
sale is the contemplated event, but merely authorizes the agent
to deliver a buyer.

ESPV

v. Eels. 207 N. E. 2d 918 (Mass. 1965);

Kellv v. Lonameyer, 435 S. W. 2d 818 (Tenn. 1967); Roskwitalski v.
Reiss,

402 A. 2d

1061, affd.

in relevant part and reversed in

part, 487 A. 2d 864 (Pa. 1979).

The authority sought by Snelson
21

in this case is even more tenuous.
asked to sell.

In this case, Associated was

Instead they bought.

Applying the rule of the

foregoing cases, the request to a trustee to foreclose does not
carry with it the right to determine the bid and buy at the sale
on behalf of the beneficiary.

Ellsworth v. Harmon, 101 111. 274

(1881).
The subject of the implied authority of a trustee under a
trust deed to bid at a sale is rejected in Corpus Juris Secundum
as follows:
It is permissible for the trustee or
auctioneer, acting in good faith, to make a
bid at the request of a prospective purchaser
who is not present in person at the sale.
However, the trustee has no implied authority
to bid on behalf of the creditor: hence,
where the creditor directs the trustee to
sell for the entire debt due, but sends no
bid nor authorizes any to be made for him, a
bid by the trustee in the creditor's
acceptance of a deed, the mere execution of a
deed, without acceptance by the creditor,
passes no title.
(Emphasis added. )"
59
C. J. S. Mortgages. §578(b).
Additional

limitations

on

any

implied

authority

exist.

"There can be no implication of authority where the subject is
covered

by

express

authority,

and

a distinct

and

independent

power cannot be made to spring from the grant of another power. "
2A C. J. S. , Agency, §154.
the trustee

is

(Emphasis added).

the only person authorized

judicial foreclosure of a trust deed.

Under Utah statute,
to

conduct

The authority granted by

statute is to sell.

The trustee' s authority to buy

beneficiary

spring

does

not

from

the

mere

request

for the
that

trustee perform his statutory duty to sell the property.
22

a non-

the

Buying

requires a separate and distinct grant of power.
It is generally

recognized

that a trustee owes both the

trustor and the beneficiary a fiduciary duty to act fairly.

Cox

v. Helenius, 693 P. 2d 683 (Wash. 1985); Blodaett v. Martsch, 590
P. 2d 298 (Utah 1978).

This dual duty also precludes a finding of

inherent or plenary authority to buy at the sale on behalf of
either party, especially in the circumstances of this case where
either the trustor or beneficiary will be harmed by the bid.

If

the duty or right to bid is inherent, does the trustee then have
to determine the fair market value of the property, at its own
risk, so as to act fairly?

If the duty or right is inherent,

could not the trustee have bid one dollar for the property on
behalf of the trustor.

The trustee is not ipso facto an agent

with authority to bid for either party.

Any finding of inherent

or implied authority to determine a bid and to buy at the sale
would defeat the trustees' duty to act impartially.
In

summary,

there

was

no evidence

in

this

case

of

any

actual authority, either express or implied, given by Bodell to
anyone to either determine the amount to be bid at the first sale
or to purchase at the sale.

Based upon the record before the

trial court, this court can conclude, as a matter of law, that
there was no authority in the trustee, either express or implied,
to purchase at the sale and this court should reverse the trial
court' s conclusion that actual authority existed in Associated
Title.
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B.

Associated

Title did not have apparent

authority

to

purchase the propertyt
The

trial

court

concluded

that

Associated

Title

had

apparent authority to enter the bid and purchase the property at
the

first

sale

on behalf

of

Bodell.

(R.

573. )

The

facts

advanced by Snelson in support of such a conclusion were set
forth in defendants' Memorandum,

(R. 484-490. )

Facts advanced

by Bodell were set forth in its Reply Memorandum.

(R. 518-524. )

The standard of review is the same for each issue presented in
this brief, i.e., this court may review any of the trial court' s
conclusions for correctness.

Gillman, supra, p. 10.

In order to prove apparent authority, all of the following
elements must be established:
1.

Acts or conduct of the principal (Bodell);

2.

Reliance on those acts by a third person

(here

McOmber or Snelson); and
3.

A

resulting

change

in

position

by

the

third

person.
2A C. J. S. , Agency §157.
It is well settled law in Utah that apparent or ostensible
authority of an agent

(here, Associated) can be inferred only

from the acts and the conduct of the principal (Bodell).

Bank of

Salt Lake v. Corporation of President of Church, etc. , 534 P. 2d
887

(Utah

1975).

The authority of an agent is not

apparent

merely because it looks so to the person with whom the agent
deals.

It is the principal who must cause third parties
24

to

believe that the agent is clothed with apparent authority.

Kuhn

v. Kuhn, 642 P. 2d 524 (Colo. App. 1981), reh. den. (1982).
Electric

v.

Dean

Evans

never

had

Chrvsler-Plvmouth.

672

P. 2d

89

City
(Utah

1983).
Snelson

any

contact with

(Snelson deposition, R. 286, p. 25-26. )

Bodell

at

any time.

There was no evidence

that Snelson ever had any contact with Associated Title.

was

McOmber never spoke to the trustee before the sale.

There

no

about

evidence

Associated

that

Title

or

McOmber
their

ever

spoke

authority

at

with

the

Bodell

sale.

(McOmber

deposition, R. 287, p. 23. )
In

light

conclude

that

of

these

acts

of

circumstances,
Bodell

created

there

is

apparent

no

basis

to

authority

in

Associated to purchase the property at the sale.
The second element of apparent authority is reliance on acts
of the principal

by,

in this

case, Snelson and McOmber.

No

reliance was demonstrated by either Snelson or McOmber.
The
change
Neither

third

in

element

position"

Snelson

of apparent

by,

in

this

nor McOmber have

authority
case,

is

Snelson

contended

"a

resulting

and

McOmber.

that they

changed

their position, let alone changed their position as a result of
Bodell' s acts.

Neither Snelson nor McOmber attended the sale.

Neither contended that they withheld bids or withheld efforts to
cure the default or sell the property in reliance on any act of
Bodell

or

Associated,

or

any

Associated' s authority.
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understanding

they

had

about

Snelson

argued

that

McOmber

"obviously

relied

on

the

authority of Associated Title by performing acts that indicated
title had been divested from him, relinquishing the rent checks
to Mr. Bodell, not resisting the transfer of names on the listing
agreement . . . "

These events occurred after the August sale,

and cannot be the basis of apparent authority at the time of the
sale.

McOmber's

differing

"reliance"

interpretations

is,

in

view

at

a

of

minimum,

subject

McOmber' s

to

subsequent

relisting of the property and his continued occupancy of the home
without making any payments.

When Mr. McOmber was informed that

the

he was pleased

first sale was

invalid,

that he would be

allowed to remain in the home and to continue to try to sell it.
(Bodell deposition, R.
acquiesced

in

the

288, p. 61.)

fact

that

If anything, Mr. McOmber

Associated

Title

did

not

have

authority to enter the bid at the first trustee' s sale.
Snelson' s argument on apparent authority is circuitous - it
assumes and uses as a starting point the ultimate issue, i. e.
whether

Associated

had

full

and

complete

authority.

A

beneficiary' s request of a trustee to foreclose, standing alone,
does not cloak a

trustee with apparent authority to bid and

purchase for the beneficiary any more than it cloaks the trustee
with apparent authority to bid for the trustor.

In summary,

Bodell did nothing to create apparent authority,

there was no

reliance, and no change of position by defendants.
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II
BODELL DID NOT RATIFY THE AUGUST TRUSTEE'S
SALE.
Snelson argued, and the trial court concluded, that Bodell
ratified Associated' s purchase of the property at the August sale
and that the ratification precludes any claim by Bodell that the
bid was unauthorized.
The

trial

court's

conclusions

are subject

for

correctness.

Qillman v.

(Utah 1989).

This court should review all facts in the light

most favorable to Bodell.

Dept. of Finan.

to review

Inst. , 782 P. 2d 506

Seftel v. Capital Citv Bank. 767 P. 2d

941 (Utah A. 1989).
In order for ratification to occur, the following elements
must be satisfied:

1) the principal's

knowledge of material

facts, and 2) an intent by the principal to ratify.

And if the

law requires the authority to have been given in writing, the
ratification must also be in writing.

Bradshaw v. McBride. 649

P. 2d 74 (Utah 1982); 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency §185, et sea.
Ratification is a matter of intention.
question of

fact.

Ratification

Its existence is a

cannot be inferred

which may be explained without any intent to ratify.
Agency §187.

from acts
3 Am. Jur. 2d

Applied to this case, where Bodell never understood

that Associated might bid any amount at the sale or that the
amount

bid

deficiency,
ratification.
48,

at

the

there

sale
was

was
not

a

factor

knowledge

in

determining

sufficient

to

the
find

(R. 502, 503; Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 36,

52, 64, 110.)

The clearest evidence of Bodell's lack of
27

intent

flows

from his

conduct after he received

the trustees

deed.

He immediately advised all involved that the bid was not

authorized and reconveyed the property to Associated.
207. )

(R. 503,

McOmber obviously acquiesced in this conduct by relisting

the property for sale himself and continuing to reside in the
home.

At a minimum, there is an issue of fact regarding Bodell' s

intent to ratify where Bodell testified that he never intended to
discharge defendants

from liability after the sale, and never

understood that the unauthorized bid might hinder his ability to
obtain full satisfaction, or even that a bid would be entered at
the sale.

(R. 502, 503. )

This case is analogous to Fuller v. Fasia Tipton Co. , Inc. ,
587 F. 2d 103 (CA 2 1978).

In Fuller, ratification was considered

in the context of whether or not ratification of a transaction
could

occur

consequences
court

where

the

principal

was

unaware

of

the

legal

of a custom in the horse auction business.

concluded

that

ratification

could

not

occur

unless

The
the

custom was understood and agreed to.
U. C. A. §25-5-1, the Utah statute of frauds requires that
"No . . . power over or concerning real
property or in any manner related thereto,
shall be created . . . otherwise than by act
or operation of law, or by deed of conveyance
in writing subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering
or
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent
thereunto authorized bv writing. "
(Emphasis
added. )
The purported right of Associated to purchase as an agent on
behalf of Bodell is a power over real property.
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Because the

authority to purchase must be given in writing, U.C. A. §25-5-1,
any ratification by Bodell must also be in writing.
Singleton, 723 P. 2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986).

Williams v.

The only writing of

Bodell subsequent to the first sale was the quit-claim deed back
to

Associated

to

".

.

.

erroneously given . . . . "

reconvey

a trustee's

deed .

There was no written ratification of

Associated' s bid - only a written renunciation.
The purpose of the principal of ratification, as applied to
an agency relationship, is to prevent unjust enrichment to the
principal and to assure that no loss accrues to innocent third
parties.

Old Security Life Insur. Co. v. Continental Illinois

National Bank & Trust, 740 F. 2d 1384 (CA 7 1984).

There was no

unjust enrichment to Bodell.
At a minimum, material conflicting inferences can be drawn
from what

Bodell

knew and its intent to ratify.

It is not

possible to look at what occurred, especially Bodell's conduct in
October of 1984, and conclude as a matter of law that it ratified
Associated' s purchase of the property.
Ill
THE NOVEMBER SALE IS
"UNILATERAL MISTAKE."

NOT

BARRED

BY

ANY

The trial court also concluded (R. 573) that "a beneficiary
[Bodell] cannot unilaterally abrogate a trustee's sale for his
own advantage on the grounds of his own unilateral mistake. "
In this

action,

it

cannot be said that

Bodell

made any

mistake regarding the bid at the sale.

Bodell did not know that

any amount had to be bid at the sale.

Bodell did not know that
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Associated had requested information from Landmark, even about a
payoff.
reason

Bodell did not know that Associated had been given any
to

believe

it

had

any

authority

deposition, 2/8/89, p. 53; R. 501, 502. )

to

bid.

(Bodell

The mistake that gave

rise to the unauthorized bid was that of Associated, and perhaps
Landmark,

in

not

obtaining

bidding

instructions.

The

first

"sale" did not occur because of any mistake of Bodell, let alone
a unilateral mistake by Bodell.
IV
THERE ARE ISSUES OF FACT WHICH
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST BODELL.

PRECLUDE

There were, in effect, competing motions before the court
asking for summary judgment.
primary

position

that

it

(R. 190, 221. )
was

entitled

It remains Bodell's

to

summary

judgment,

declaring the first sale void purely as a matter of law based
upon Associated' s lack of authority to purchase for Bodell at the
sale.

For all the reasons discussed, Bodell believes there was

no purchaser

at the August sale.

This

court is entitled

to

substitute its own conclusions for those of the trial court, and
to reverse the case as a matter of law.
At
summary

a

minimum,

judgment

there

against

are

issues

Bodell.

of

In

fact

which

considering

preclude
the

facts

presented, this court must review them such that all reasonable
inferences are drawn in favor of Bodell.
Bank,

767 P. 2d 941

(Utah A.

1989. )

Seftel v. Capital Citv

The issues of fact which

preclude summary judgment against Bodell include the following:
1.

With respect to the January 9, 1984 letter:
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(a)

Bodell understood its purpose was only to

"get the ball rolling" and not to confer any authority
in Associated to determine a bid and buy at the sale,
(Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 26, 28, 29. );
(b)
ball

Terry understood the letter only to get the

rolling,

and

not

as

conferring

any

authority.

(Terry deposition, 12/22/88, p. 34-36, 126; R. 214);
(c)

Associated testified that in this

case it

would not have treated the letter as authority to bid.
(Heiner deposition, p. 22. )
At a minimum, this testimony creates an issue as to whether
express

authority

Associated.

to bid

or purchase was

ever

given to

The only other basis for the actual authority

of Associated to purchase at the sale is through some sort
of authority
authority,

implied
standards

significant.

The

from the sale.
of

only

practice
evidence

In construing this
in

the

on this

industry

are

issue was

the

testimony of Alfred Newman (R. 505) that industry standards
on bidding by trustees require explicit authority from the
beneficiary.

The existence of these standards create, at a

minimum, an issue of fact as to whether implied authority
existed in Associated Title to bid.

Another issue of fact

is created by the telephone message from Terry to Heiner
which

clearly

states

that it is a "payoff,"

not a bid.

Construing these facts most favorably to plaintiff, summary
judgment against Bodell on the issue of actual
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authority

(either express or implied) was inappropriate.

Sandbera v.

Kline, 576 P. 2d 1291 (Utah 1978).
2.

There was no evidence that any conduct by Bodell

created apparent authority.
3.

There was no evidence that Bodell "knowingly or

intentionally"

ratified

the

unauthorized

bid.

Bodell

testified that it did not understand the sale process or the
significance of the bid.
38, supra. )

(Bodell deposition, 2/8/89, p. 36,

This lack of understanding, when construed in

the light most favorable to Bodell, creates a fact issue as
to whether the material

facts surrounding the transaction

were brought home to Bodell sufficiently so that it can be
said that a knowing, intentional ratification occurred.
4.

With

respect

to

the

issue

of

mistake,

the

Memorandum of Snelson alone, R. 487, para. 9, acknowledges
disputes of fact as to how the mistake arose with respect to
the bid.
5.

There

is

a

sister

case

to

this

one

presently

pending in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County,
Civil No. C88-5531.
Associated

The action is one by Bodell against

Title alleging,

part of Associated Title.
in

that

action

inter alia,

negligence

on the

On December 8, 1989, the parties

(including

Snelson

and

McOmber)

argued

motions

for summary judgment which included the issue of

whether

Bodell

ratified

the

first

sale.

denied the Motion for Summary Judgment.
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Judge

Daniels

(A certified copy

of

Associated7 s

appended hereto.)

Memorandum

and

the

court' s

ruling

are

Judge Daniels' conclusion reflects, that

at least with respect to the issue of ratification, that
facts exist on which reasonable men could reach different
conclusions.
When Bodell' s statement of facts are considered in the light
most favorable to Bodell, at a minimum, there are significant
material issues of fact which preclude summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's judgment should be reversed, and the case
remanded for the determination of the deficiency, if any, to be
awarded Bodell.

In the alternative, the summary judgment against

Bodell should be set aside and the matter remanded to be set for
trial in the District Court.
DATED this 27th day of June, 1990.

Keith W. Meade
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
Attorney for Appellant
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that
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
J. Rand Hirschi
Attorney for Appellee Snelson
230 South 500 East, #460
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
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EXHIBIT
K e i t h W. M e a d e (Bar N o . 2 2 1 8 )
C O H N E , R A P P A P O R T <5c S E G A L

66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-2665

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
AFFIDAVIT OF BLAKE HEINER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 68297

DAVID McOMBER, et al.,

Judge Ballif

Defendants.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

STATE OF UTAH

)
) ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
BLAKE HEINER, upon oath, states as follows:
1.

I am an officer of Associated title Company and have personal knowledge

of the matters set forth herein.
2.

I was the officer of Associated Title who conducted the sales of the

property described on Exhibit "A" attached, on August 31, 1984 and November 19, 1984.
3.

Prior to the August 31 sale, I had no communication with Michael Bodell or

anyone from Bodell Construction.
4.

Prior to the August 31 sale, I received a telephone message from Roger

Terry of Landmark Mortgage, a copy of which is attached as Exhibit n B". I did not speak
with Roger Terry regarding the message until after the August 31 sale.
5.

No one that I was aware of attended the sale of the property on August 31,

1984 other than myself.
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0.
Th« bid r*tmrrm<l to in i>«r.uwi * , . < . , . . .
No 27110 was made by myself based upon the telephone message referred to in paragraph

4 above, that I received from Roger Terry.
7.

I was informed after the August 31 sale by Bodell Construction and Roger

Terry that the amount referred to in paragraph G of the Trusteed Deed was not intended
to be a bid amount.
8.

I was never given, by Roger Terry, ^Landmark Mortgage, or anyone from

Bodell Construction Company, any authority to determine the amount that was to be bid
at the August 31 trustee's sale on behalf of Bodell Construction Company.
9.

The trusteed sale on November 19, 1984 was conducted at the request of

Bodell Construction because they told me that my bid at the August 31, 1984 sale was
not authorized.
DATED this

day of February, 1987.

^^^AXABlake T. Heiner
Vice President
Associated Title Company

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on the 4 t h day of February, 1986, by

Blake T. Heiner, the signer of the foregoing instrument.
/

isiding in
My Commission Expires;

S a l t Lake C i t y ,

Utah

December 17/ 1988
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K e i t h W. M e a d e <B«r N o . 2 2 1 8 )

COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL
66 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-2666

WILLIAM F. HUISH. CLERK
.DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TH£ FOU ILH J b i / i u ^ L J L J T ^ I W V
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
'AFFIDAVIT OF ROGER TERRY

Plaintiff,
vs.

V^i > i i

DAVID McOMBER, et al.,

Judge Ballif

* •O *

Defendants.
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

STATE OF UTAH
) ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ROGER TERRY, upon oath, states as follows:
1.

I am an officer of Landmark Mortgage and have personal knowledge of the

matters set forth herein.
2.

I never discussed with Mike Bodell or anyone from Bodell Construction the

amount to be bid at the Trusteed sale conducted on August 31, 1984.
3.

At no time did I have authority from Mike Bodell or Bodell Construction to

determine the amount which would be bid at the Trustee's sale of the property which
occurred on August 31, 1984.
4. Prior to the sale, Blake Heiner of Associated Title contacted me and asked for
the payoff figure on the loan. I informed him of the payoff amount. I was not requested

214

to provide any blddl.. s ...„,. r u a ,.,<„,, w l l h
DATED t h i s j #

r « w « r u %t> t „„

„

day of January, 1987.

,^S^_

CA^

Roger Terry

/ ^

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on the 30

by fe/6/- l&Tr-r

day of TfwuAty

, 1986,

, the signer of the foregoing instrument

M

v

Notary rubiic
Public pu
Residing in ^JK

»*/
$QL

.
I ^<r
£Lff\

My Commission Expires:

MAILING CERTIFICATE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Affidavit of Roger Terry was mailed, postage fully prepaid, this

IJ~ day of Jamtaty,

1987, to the following:
B. Ray Zoll
Attorney at Law
5251 South Green Street, Suite 205
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Rand Hirschi
Attorney at Law
City Centre
400 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

(Bodell-2)

2
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EXHIBIT
C P H O I M E CS^VdT^
FOR.
M

-bxAftfi
ga^Z.

.OATH

Ekm^«l
AjArfoEm

OF.

PHONE

•

<

%

AKEACOOe
U3EAC006

/

^

»

/

lyuMeCR •

PLEASE CALL

MESSAGE

r^?^,

IONED

RETURNED
YOUR CALL

WLLCALL AGAIN

ISIST^nUi

CAME
TO SEE YOU
WANTS
TO SEE YOU
TOPS W FORM 4 0 0 3

s

;XHJBlT"c»

->

DISTRICT COURT

.< y.3T3tCt

zC^T7--:s

Bruce A. Maak, Of Counsel (A2033)
KIMBALL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS
Attorneys for Defendant
Associated Title Company
Suite 1300, 185 South State Street
P.O. Box 11019
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147
Telephone: (801) 532-7840

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,

Civil No. C88-5531
(Hon. Scott Daniels)

Defendant.
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
vs.
LANDMARK MORTGAGE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
DAVID I. McOMBER and RACHEL B.
McOMBER as trustees of the
David I. McOmber Family Trust,
and DAVID I. McOMBER, RACHEL B.
McOMBER, and STEVEN M. SNELSON,
individually,
Third-Party Defendants.

Defendant Associated Title Company respectfully submits this
Memorandum in support of its Motion for Summary Judgment.
INTRODUCTION
To place in context the uncontested facts that follow,
Associated Title Company offers the following summary of the facts
and arguments that are germane to the Motion for Summary Judgment
before the Court.
Michael Bodell is a principal of Bodell Construction Company,
Inc.

Either or both are sometimes referred to hereinafter as

"Bodell." Landmark Mortgage Company is a company that is owned
and controlled by Roger Terry and which engages in the mortgage
brokering and arranging business. Associated Title Company, as
its name suggests, is a title company that sometimes conducts
trustee's sales under trust deeds. Blake Heiner is an employee of
Associated Title Company.
Roger Terry and his company, Landmark Mortgage Company,
brokered and/or arranged a $200,000 mortgage loan from Bodell
Construction Company, Inc. to third-party defendants Snelson and
McOmbers.

Snelson and McOmbers did not pay as agreed, and Bodell

requested that Landmark and Terry cause to be initiated a foreclosure of the Trust Deed securing the loan. Landmark and Terry
requested that Associated Title Company act as trustee in connection with that foreclosure. At the trustee's sale, Associated
Title Company bid on behalf of Bodell Construction Company
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approximately $230,000, which was the full amount then owed to
Bodell.

Bodell thereafter unsuccessfully attempted to sell the

property for about the same amount.

Being unable to do so, Bodell

spoke to his lawyer, who suggested that Bodell claim that the
trustee was unauthorized to bid the full loan amount, rescind the
original sale, conduct a new sale at a lower price, and sue the
borrowers for a deficiency.

This was accomplished.

After the new

sale at the lesser price, Bodell initiated a deficiency action
against McOmbers and Snelson in the District Court of Utah County.
After the District Court of Utah County ruled that the first sale
was effective and, accordingly, McOmbers and Snelson had no
liability to Bodell, Bodell initiated this action against
Associated Title Company.
In this action, Bodell seeks to recover from Associated the
deficiency that he claims he would otherwise have recovered,
claiming that Associated Title Company, as trustee under the Trust
Deed, improperly and without his authority bid the full amount
owed to Bodell at the trustee's sale, depriving him of a deficiency judgment against McOmbers and Snelson and resulting in
damages of some $80,000.
The thrust of the Motion for Summary Judgment is that,
irrespective of whether Bodell did or did not authorize the bid
that was made at the first trustee's sale, Bodell by his conduct
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ratified that sale, waived any claim that the bid was unauthorized,
and is estopped to assert that the bid was unauthorized.
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
The following facts, for purposes of this Motion only, are
undisputed:
1.

Roger Terry and Landmark Mortgage arranged 8 to 12

mortgage loans for Bodell, All were handled in basically the same
manner -- Terry brought Bodell a loan application package describing the prospective loan, assisted in the closing of the loan,
serviced the loan by collecting payments, handled communications
on behalf of Bodell with the owner/debtor, and, when foreclosure
was necessary, Terry handled it for Bodell.

[Bodell Deposition at

15-17.]
2.

In late 1983, Roger Terry and Landmark Mortgage arranged

the subject loan for Bodell.

Bodell loaned $200,000 to the

McOmbers and Snelson. Among other things, Terry gave Bodell an
appraisal showing that the McOmber house was worth $300,000.
Bodell himself did not look at the property before making the
loan.

[Bodell Deposition at 14-15, 18.] The loan was to bear 18

percent per annum as interest and was secured by the McOmber
residence.
3.

[Bodell Deposition at 14-15; Deposition Exhibit 2.]

McOmbers and Snelson did not make a payment under the

loan and so Bodell caused foreclosure proceedings to be initiated.
[Bodell Deposition at 24-25.]
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4.

Bodell directed Terry to assist him in proceeding with

foreclosure and gave Terry a letter to Landmark Mortgage Company
dated January 9, 1984, which stated as follows:
Gentlemen,
Please accept this letter as authorization to immediately begin foreclosure
against the property associated with this
loan.
We hereby grant you and the title company
of your choice full and complete authority
regarding this foreclosure action.
Please inform me if you require further
information.
Very truly yours,
s/ Michael J. Bodell
Bodell knew that Terry was going to give this letter to a title
company and assumed that the title company would rely on it.
[Bodell Deposition at 25-26; Deposition Exhibit 5.]
this letter to Associated Title Company.

Terry gave

[Terry Deposition at

40.]
5.

During April, 1984, Bodell signed a Substitution of

Trustee, appointing Associated Title Company as successor trustee
under the McOmber Trust Deed.
6.

[Bodell Deposition at 34-35.]

In early May, 1984, Bodell requested that Terry furnish

him with the appraisal on the McOmber property that was a part of
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the loan application package because Bodell wanted some idea of
the value of the property being foreclosed.

[Bodell Deposition at

39-40.] That appraisal indicated that the value of the McOmber
property was $300,000.
Exhibit 1.]

Bodell received no other appraisal prior to the

trustee's sale.
7.

[Bodell Deposition at 18; Deposition

[Bodell Deposition at 40.]

Associated Title Company issued a Notice of Trustee's

Sale under the McOmber Trust Deed on July 30, 1984. That Notice
of Trustee's Sale scheduled the sale for August 31, 1984.

[Depo-

sition Exhibit 11.] Associated Title Company mailed the Notice of
Trustee's Sale both to Landmark Mortgage Company and to Bodell on
July 31, 1984, and both Landmark Mortgage Company and Bodell
received the Notice of Trustee's Sale on August 1, 1984. [Affidavit of Blake T. Heiner, H 4 and 5.]
8.

Bodell knew, prior to August 31, 1984, that there was

going to be a trustee's sale under the McOmber Trust Deed at that
time.

[Bodell Deposition at 45.] Although Bodell expected that

Bodell would buy the property at the sale, (i) Bodell never spoke
with anyone at Associated Title Company prior to the sale and (ii)
Bodell did not convey any bidding instructions to Landmark or
Terry prior to the sale.

Bodell knew that Associated Title

Company could not have received any bidding instructions prior to
the sale.

[Bodell Deposition at 47-48, 52, and 57.]
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9.

The parties' testimony differs as to the bidding in-

structions that were given to Associated Title Company.

Associated

acknowledges that there are disputed facts in this area, but those
facts are irrelevant to this Motion.

The parties1 versions are

included here only because those versions will be helpful to the
Court's understanding of the overall facts.
(a) Associated asserts that it telephoned Terry or his
office and requested instructions as to what should be bid at
the trustee's sale and thereafter received a telephone
message stating that the payoff at the sale was to be
$243,127.15.

[Heiner Deposition at 9-10.]

(b) Terry asserts that Associated requested a "payoff,"
and Terry called Associated Title Company with a "payoff
amount," which was the full amount owed under the loan,
including a part of Terry's commission on the loan that was
then unpaid.

[Terry Deposition at 56; Affidavit of Roger

Terry (Deposition Exhibit 24).]
(c) Bodell asserts that Associated should have bid the
fair market value of the property, but concedes that he gave
no one any bidding instructions and that no one ever told
Associated Title Company what the fair market value was.
[Bodell Deposition at 62-65.]
10.

The trustee's sale was conducted on August 31, 1984, and

Associated credit bid $243,681.90 on behalf of Bodell and pur-
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chased the property for Bodell.

[Deposition Exhibit 14 to Bodell

Deposition.]
11.

Within a week to ten days after the sale on August 31,

1984, Bodell was told by Terry that the sale had occurred and that
approximately $240,000 had been bid for the property.
Deposition at 67-68.]

[Bodell

During that same conversation, Bodell

claims that he objected to the amount bid by Associated Title
Company.
12.

[Bodell Deposition at 79-80.]
After learning of the sale and bid amount, Bodell

contacted Cal Monson, a realtor, to list and sell the property.
Bodell, as owner, signed a Listing Agreement with Monson, authorizing Monson to sell the property for $239,000.

[Bodell Deposi-

tion at 70-72; Deposition Exhibit 16.] When Bodell signed the
Listing Agreement as owner, he knew that Bodell owned the property
because it had purchased it at a trustee's sale, that the bid
price had been wrong at that trustee's sale, and that Bodell did
not like the bid.
13.

[Bodell Deposition at 71, 80.]

During late September, 1984, Bodell received from Roger

Terry a rent check in the amount of $200.00 from Jeff and Kathy
Kober, who were renting the bottom portion of the McOmber home.
Bodell cashed the check.

[Bodell Deposition at 73-74; Deposition

Exhibit 17.] At the time he cashed the check, Bodell understood
that the money was rent from people who lived in the basement of
the property that he had purchased at a foreclosure sale, that the
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bid price was wrong at the foreclosure sale, and that he objected
to that bid price.
14.

[Bodell Deposition at 74, 80.]

If someone had approached Bodell on September 12, 1984

(after Bodell knew of the trustee's sale and the amount bid at
that sale), and offered to purchase the property for $239,000 in
cash, he would have sold it to them.

[Bodell Deposition at

72-73.]
15.

During early October, 1984, Bodell became concerned

about whether the property was worth what had been bid for it, and
so Bodell called his attorney, Richard Rappaport, "because I
wanted to know what we do now that it's becoming obvious to me
that the property isn't going to solve my debt problem.

Isn't

going to be, isn't going to net us anywhere near what is owed us.
So the next step was, well, how do we get the difference."
[Bodell Deposition at 77-78.]
16.

On October 3, 1984, Bodell and Terry met with Bodell's

counsel, Richard Rappaport. At that meeting, according to Terry's
notes, with which Bodell agrees, "Mr. Rappaport said to get bid
down must claim trustee did not have authority to bid amount he
did."

[Bodell Deposition at 82-83; Deposition Exhibit 13.]

17.

Thereafter, Rappaport, Bodell, and Terry attempted to

undo the effects of the first trustee's s.ale:
(a) Mr. Rappaport instructed Mr. Terry to call the
McOmbers and tell them that an error was made and that they
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could stay in the house for another 30 days*

[Bodell Deposi-

tion at 84; Deposition Exhibit 13.]
(b)

Bodell also instructed Terry to tell McOmbers to

keep the home on the market but that the ownership listing
would have to be changed (to reflect McOmbers as owner,
rather than Bodell, as owner).

[Bodell Deposition at 85;

Deposition Exhibit 13.]
(c)

McOmbers did in fact execute a Listing Agreement as

owners with Cal Monson dated October 4, 1984.

[Deposition

Exhibit 18.]
(d)

Mr. Rappaport directed Associated Title Company to

record a Quitclaim Deed conveying the property from Bodell
Construction Company back to Associated Title Company, as
trustee, so that another trustee's sale could be conducted.
[Bodell Deposition at 94; Deposition Exhibit 19.]
(e)

Bodell secured a new appraisal, dated November 6,

1984, to determine the fair market value of the property.
[Bodell Deposition at 95.]
(f)

At the request of Mr. Rappaport, Associated Title

Company thereafter conducted a second trustee's sale of the
property on November 19, 1984 and, at the direction of
Bodell, bid $170,000.

[Affidavit of Blake T. Heiner, 16.]
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ARGUMENT
For two independently sufficient reasons, Associated Title
Company is entitled to the dismissal with prejudice of the Complaint as against Associated Title Company.

Each will be

addressed in turn.
A.

Bodell has waived and is estopped to assert any claim

against Associated Title Company.

Under Utah law, a waiver occurs

when one intentionally relinquishes a known right.
Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983).

Hunter v.

Such a waiver may be either

express or implied from the conduct of the parties.

<Id.

Here,

the undisputed facts establish that Bodell waived any claim that
Associated Title Company lacked authority to bid the amount that
was bid at the first trustee's sale and/or Bodell waived the right
to direct Associated Title Company to bid a sum other than the one
that was bid at the first sale.
As Bodell's own testimony establishes, Bodell had knowledge
of the following matters prior to the August 31, 1984 sale:
First, Bodell knew that the sale would occur on August 31, 1984.
Second, Bodell knew that he had delivered a letter to Landmark,
which would be delivered to a title company, which "grant[ed] you
and the title company of your choice full and complete authority
regarding this foreclosure action.!!

Third, Bodell expected that

Bodell would be the purchaser at the trustee's sale and that,
accordingly, someone would have to bid on behalf of Bodell.
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Fourth, Bodell knew that he had not given any instructions,
directly, to Associated Title Company concerning bidding at the
sale and that the only communication concerning bidding at the
sale was his communication to Roger Terry to the effect that he,
Bodell, might attend the sale. Thus, Bodell knew that the sale
would go forward without any instructions or directions from
Bodell as to bidding.

A clearer case of an intentional relin-

quishment of a known right cannot be imagined.

Bodell knowingly

relinquished his right to direct the bidding at the sale by
allowing the sale to occur without attending the sale or giving
any bidding instructions, all the time knowing that he had the
right to do so and that no arrangements concerning bidding had
been made by Bodell.
Bodell is also estopped to assert any claim against Associated
Title Company arising from its bidding on Bodell?s behalf at the
first sale. This estoppel has two distinct sources. First,
Bodell is estopped because he knew that he had not given anyone
any bidding instructions and allowed the sale to proceed without
giving such instructions.

The Utah Supreme Court has established

that the doctrine of estoppel has application when one, by his
acts, representations, or conduct, or by his silence when he ought
to speak, induces another to believe certain facts exist and such
other relies thereon to his detriment. E.g., Leaver v. Grose, 610
P.2d 1262 (Utah 1980).

Here, Bodell delivered a letter of author-
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ity to Landmark Mortgage Company, which he knew would be delivered
to a title company.

That letter of authority granted to the title

company "full and complete authority regarding this foreclosure
action.tf

Bodell testified that he knew the title company would

rely upon the authorization letter.

Bodell never spoke with

Associated Title Company prior to the trustee's sale.

Bodell knew

that no bidding instructions had been given prior to the trustee's
sale and that no one would be appearing on behalf of Bodell at the
trustee's sale.

Thus, Bodell knew that the trustee's sale would

occur and that Associated Title Company would not have received,
prior thereto, any instructions other than the blanket authority
granted in Bodell!s authorization letter granting the title
company "full and complete authority regarding this foreclosure
action."

With knowledge of those facts, Bodell's failure to take

any action to either appear at the sale and bid or advise
Associated Title Company of what bid was expected precludes Bodell
from now complaining about the bid that was made at the sale.
Associated, in ignorance of Bodellfs secret bidding desires,
conducted the sale, bid the amount of the debt, and has now
obviously suffered a detriment.
Second, the Utah Supreme Court has embraced acquiescence as
providing the basis for an estoppel.

In Zeese v. Estate of

Siegel, 534 P.2d 85 (Utah 1975), the Court held that where a partydoes not challenge an allegedly unauthorized act, but instead by
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his act and conduct indicates acquiescence in the act, the party
is estopped to assert that the act was unauthorized.

To the same

effect, see Larsen v. Knight, 232 P.2d 365 (Utah 1951). Here,
according to Bodell, he learned within a week to ten days after
the first trustee's sale that the sale had occurred and that
Associated Title had bid on behalf of Bodell the amount of the
debt against the property.

With the knowledge that Bodell had

purchased the property at the trustee's sale for the amount of the
loan, Bodell proceeded to list the property for sale and to
collect the rents from the property.

Bodell obviously acquiesced

in the sale, because he immediately began to capitalize upon its
benefits -- ownership.

Because Bodell acquiesced in the sale, he

is estopped to assert that the bid resulting in that sale to him
was inappropriate.
B.

Bodell ratified the first trustee's sale and the bid

that resulted in Bodell's purchase. All of Bodell's claims
against Associated are premised upon the assertion that Associated
exceeded its authority by bidding as it did at the first trustee's
sale.

It will be established below that Bodell ratified

Associated's purchase of the property on behalf of Bodell and that
such ratification releases Associated of all liability arising
from any claim that its bid was unauthorized.
The Utah Supreme Court in Kidd v. Maldonado, 688 P.2d 461
(Utah 1984) stated as follows:
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When an agent exceeds his express authority, • . .
ratification by the principal releases the
agent from liability and damages. Ici. at 462.
To the same effect, see Moses v. Archie McFarland & Sons, 230 P.2d
571, 573 (Utah 1951), and Restatement of Agency 2d, §338.

Thus,

if it can be established that Bodell ratified Associated1s purchase of the property at the first sale, it follows that Bodell
can have no claim against Associated arising from its bidding and
purchasing the property at the first sale on behalf of Bodell.
In Moses v. Archie McFarland & Sons, 230 P.2d 571 (Utah
1951), the Court held as follows:
Ratification like original authority need not
be expressed. Any conduct which indicates
assent by the purported principal to become a
party to the transaction or which is justifiable only if there is ratification is sufficient. Even silence with full knowledge of
the facts may manifest affirmance and thus
operate as a ratification. Id., at 573-574.
In Lowe v. April Indus., Inc., 531 P.2d 1297, 1299 (Utah
1974), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Ratification is expressed or implied.
Implied, where it arises under circumstances
of acquiescence or where a duty to disaffirm
is not promptly exercised. Knowledge, usually,
is a requisite to any form of ratification.
In the Lowe case, the Court held that a party with knowledge of a
transaction and an agent's acts ratified the agentfs acts by
failing to disaffirm them within a reasonable time.

-15-

Similarly, in Doxey-Layton Co. v. Holbrook, 479 P.2d 348
(Utah 1971), the Court addressed a claim against the makers of a
note who claimed they were not liable under the note because their
alleged agent improperly and without authority wrote in payment
terms on the note after they had executed it. The Supreme Court
held that the makers of the note had ratified their agent's act by
executing extensions of the note after learning that their alleged
agent had inserted the payment terms about which they objected.
The foregoing cases stand for the proposition that when a
party, with knowledge of an alleged unauthorized act of his agent,
by his conduct indicates that he affirms the agent's act, a
ratification occurs.

"Any conduct which indicates assent by the

purported principal to become a party to the transaction or which
is justifiable only if there is ratification is sufficient.11
Moses v. Archie McFarland & Sons, supra at 574.
The application of the doctrine is especially clear when the
party challenging the agent's authority accepts the benefits of
the agent's exercise of such authority.

In Moses v. Archie

McFarland & Sons, 230 P.2d 571, 575 (Utah 1951), the Utah Supreme
Court held that when an agent acts without authority, the principal
cannot confirm such part of his action as is beneficial and reject
such part as is detrimental -- ratification of part of the transaction ratifies the whole of the transaction.

"If a principal

ratifies part of a transaction, he is deemed to ratify the whole
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of it.!f

Navrides v. Zurich Ins. Co., 488 P.2d 637 (Cal. 1971).

Similarly, in Floor v. Mitchell, 41 P.2d 281 (Utah 1935), the
Court stated as follows:
When a principal claims the benefits of a
contract made by his agent, he cannot repudiate
the acts of his agent on the grounds such acts
were unauthorized. Accepting a contract and
claiming the fruits thereof, the principal
takes with whatever taint attaches to its
origin. Id., at 287.
To the same effect, see Latses v. Nick Floor, Inc., 100 P.2d 619
(Utah 1940).
Based upon the testimony of Michael Bodell, alone, the
doctrine of ratification clearly applies here and absolves
Associated of liability.

Bodell testified that, within a week to

ten days after the August 31, 1984 sale, he knew that the sale had
occurred and the amount that Associated had bid on his behalf at
the sale.

He also knew that he had become the owner of the

property by virtue of Associated1s bidding and purchasing the
property for Bodell at the sale.

With that knowledge, Bodell

proceeded to enjoy the benefits of property ownership.
owner, listed the property for sale.

He, as

He, as owner, accepted and

cashed at least one rent check from the property.

He testified

that, if anyone had offered to purchase the property for the
listed sale price, he would have sold the property to them.
Bodell cannot have it both ways.

He cannot assert that he is the

owner of the property and entitled to sell same and receive rent
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from same but, if things don't work out as he hopes, take the
position that the bid resulting in his purchase of the property
was unauthorized.
imagined.

A clearer case of ratification cannot be

Further, since the only facts upon which this defense

is based come from Michael Bodellfs deposition, there can be no
issue of fact.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the doctrines of ratification, waiver, and estoppel, Bodell is precluded from recovering against Associated Title
Company.

The facts dictating the application of those doctrines

are not in dispute, nor can they be, since the source of those
facts is the deposition of Michael Bodell.

Summary Judgment

should be granted.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 31

jteft

of QcrrfoBL.

1989.

Maak, Of Counsel
[LL, PARR, CROCKETT & WADDOUPS
ftorneys for Defendant
Associated Title Company

<.JK/,
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Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218)
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C.
525 East First South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorney for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*

*

*

*

*

BODELL CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,

*

*

*

)

INC. , a Utah corporation,

)

Plaintiff,

ORDER

)

vs

)

ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant.
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,

)
)
)

Civil No. C88-5531

)

Judge Scott Daniels

Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs
LANDMARK MORTGAGE COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
DAVIS I. McOMBER and RACHEL B.
McOMBER as trustees of the
David I. McOmber Family Trust,
and DAVID I. McOMBER, RACHEL B.
McOMBER, and STEVEN M. SNELSON,
individually,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Third-Party
Defendants.

)
)
*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

This matter came on before the court on December 8, 198 9,
pursuant to the motion of Associated Title for partial summary
judgment.
Also before the court was the motion of Bodell Construction
to continue the trial date based upon matters pending in the Utah
County action involving some of the same parties.

There was no

opposition to the motion to continue by any party,

either in

writing or at oral argument.
The court,

having considered

the pleadings

filed and the

argument of counsel, hereby
ORDERS

that

the

Motion

of

Associated

Title

for

Summary

Judgment be and hereby is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the trial presently set in this
matter

to commence

on January

16,

1990, be continued without

date.

Any party may request in the future that the matter be

rescheduled for trial.
* DATED this

9^

da

Y

of

December, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

S u*jJr\\,...
Judge Scott Daniels
District Judge

'Jjft

